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WAS SOCRATES A CHRISTIAN BEFORE CHRIST? 
KIERKEGAARD AND THE  
PROBLEM OF CHRISTIAN UNIQUENESS
Michael A. Cantrell
Kierkegaard’s belief that Socrates embodied a prefigurement of Christian 
neighbor love militates against the claim that Kierkegaard believed there was 
absolutely no intimation of the obligation to love the neighbor in paganism. 
Kierkegaard also accepted that any awareness of the obligation to love the 
neighbor must be divinely originated. These beliefs and Kierkegaard’s other 
claims regarding the daimonion and Socrates’s “becoming a Christian” sup-
port the view that Kierkegaard believed Socrates to have been a recipient 
of special divine revelation. The plausibility of this conclusion and its con-
sistency with Kierkegaard’s apostle/genius distinction is explored. Finally, 
speculative reasons are given as to why God might have chosen to give 
Socrates the daimonion.
The second-century Christian apologist Justin Martyr once claimed that 
those among the ancient Greeks who lived in accordance with reason were, 
in fact, Christians. Justin points to Socrates by name, going so far as to say 
that Socrates actually had a partial knowledge of Christ.1 Justin Martyr is not 
the only Christian thinker to have made such extraordinary claims about 
Socrates. In this paper, I consider those claims made by the nineteenth-
century Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard. I argue that, although the 
statement that “Kierkegaard saw Socrates as a Christian before Christ” is 
probably misleading, it is nonetheless probably not inaccurate.
Parts I and II examine Kierkegaard’s claims about the uniqueness 
of Christianity and discuss reasons for thinking that Kierkegaard saw 
Socrates as something of an exception to these uniqueness claims. Part III 
argues that Kierkegaard was committed to the view that Socrates was the 
recipient of special divine revelation by means of his daimonion. Part IV 
evaluates Kierkegaard’s statements about Socrates through the categories 
of The Book on Adler, concluding that, for Kierkegaard, Socrates occupies 
an unexcluded conceptual middle ground between the “genius” and the 
“apostle.” Part V explores how Socrates could have been the beneficiary of 
1Cf. Justin Martyr, “First Apology of Justin Martyr,” ch. XLVI, and “Second Apology of 
Justin Martyr,” ch. X in Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson 
(Peabody, MA: Hendrickson Publishers, 2004), Vol. 1.
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special divine revelation yet still fail to possess any authority on account 
of that revelation. Part VI hazards a couple of broad speculations as to 
what Kierkegaard might have believed regarding why God chose to give 
Socrates the daimonion. Finally, part VII concludes the paper, drawing out 
the implication of Kierkegaard’s belief that, regardless of how many times 
an awareness of the obligation to love might have appeared in human 
history, it is something that must be divinely impressed anytime it appears.
I. The Challenge of the Uniqueness Claim
In his book Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, C. Stephen Evans develops a divine 
command theory of moral obligation that is similar in many respects to 
that defended by Robert M. Adams.2 Evans maintains that moral obli-
gations are rooted in divine commands that are promulgated to human 
beings through both special and general revelation. But Evans does not 
merely develop this view as a plausible philosophical position. Rather, as 
he maintains, the view he describes is actually Kierkegaard’s ethical view 
as well.
I am not concerned in this paper to argue for or against Evans’s broad 
account of Kierkegaard’s ethical views. Yet, while I find much that is ad-
mirable in Evans’s work, I am for the moment interested in a particular 
interpretive obstacle for Evans’s view that arises out of Kierkegaard’s 
Works of Love. Evans argues that Kierkegaard believes that part of the 
central Christian ethical teaching (i.e., the love commandment, “You shall 
love your neighbor as yourself”) is promulgated through general revela-
tion, with the result that it is universally available. The obstacle is what 
Evans identifies in his book as Kierkegaard’s “uniqueness claim.”3 Evans 
characterizes the uniqueness claim as follows: Kierkegaard believed that 
“Christian teachings are not only unique and unknown in paganism, but 
contain within themselves the ‘possibility of offense,’ a natural tendency 
to shock and disturb the person who has not been fully transformed by 
Christianity.”4 Such a claim poses a problem for Evans’s project because 
if Christian teachings are “unique and unknown in paganism,” this cuts 
against the view that the love commandment is promulgated through 
general revelation.
To meet this challenge, Evans marshals textual evidence to argue 
that other views to which Kierkegaard is committed militate against the 
uniqueness claim. By my count, Evans offers three considerations by which 
he purports to show that Kierkegaard himself does not (or at least should 
not) accept the uniqueness claim.5 First, he argues that it is hard to see 
2Cf. Robert M. Adams, Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1999), chaps. 10 and 11.
3C. Stephen Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love: Divine Commands and Moral Obligations (Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 158–159.
4Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 158.
5Evans gives several other arguments in this section. However, it is hard to see how these 
other arguments are intended to establish that the specific obligation to love the neighbor is 
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how the uniqueness claim “could be reconciled with [Kierkegaard’s] claim 
that God has placed love ‘within the ground’ of every human person.”6 
As I read the passage7 to which Evans refers, however, Kierkegaard com-
mits himself only to the conditional claim that if a person is ethically or 
spiritually “built up,” then God has implanted love in his or her heart.8 But 
suppose that we grant Evans his preferred reading, i.e., that Kierkegaard 
believes that God has in fact “placed love within the ground” of every 
person. As it turns out, this still does not get Evans all that he needs. For, 
to count against the uniqueness claim, he needs to show not simply that 
love is somewhere present without a special revelation, but rather that an 
awareness of the obligation to love is so present.9 After all, Kierkegaard is 
quite emphatic that what is striking about Christian love is that it is com-
manded. Not love but the “you shall love” is the mark of the distinctively 
Christian teaching.
The same consideration serves to cast doubt on the promise of a second 
passage to which Evans appeals in support of his interpretation. Evans ar-
gues that Kierkegaard “explicitly admits that since Christianity is nothing 
new in the sense of ‘novelty,’ that there are parallels of a sort between 
Christian teachings and paganism.”10 The passage of Kierkegaard’s to 
which Evans refers is the following: “The commandment [i.e., ‘You shall 
love’] is not something new in an accidental sense, nor a novelty in the 
sense of something curious, nor something new in a temporal sense. Love 
had existed also in paganism, but this obligation to love is a change of 
eternity—and everything has become new.”11 Kierkegaard here clearly 
acknowledges that love “existed also in paganism,” and this certainly 
constitutes a parallel of sorts to Christian love; unfortunately, however, 
this is not a parallel that is useful to Evans’s attempt to argue against the 
uniqueness claim. Rather, what Evans needs for this purpose is a passage 
in which Kierkegaard recognizes some pagan individual as possessing an 
awareness of the obligation to love.
The strongest evidence that Evans produces for his view is precisely his 
observation that Kierkegaard sees Socrates as embodying a prefigurement 
of Christian love. One of the passages that Evans has in mind is worth 
quoting at length:
promulgated through general revelation, as opposed to establishing merely that some moral 
obligations are so promulgated.
6Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 159–160.
7Kierkegaard writes, “But can one human being implant love in another human being’s 
heart? No, this is a suprahuman relationship, an inconceivable relationship between human 
beings; in this sense human love cannot build up. It is God, the Creator, who must implant 
love in each human being, he who himself is Love.” Works of Love, trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 216.
8Cf. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 216.
9More precisely, Evans needs to show that Kierkegaard thought this to be the case.
10Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 159.
11Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 25.
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[W]hy did that simple wise man of old [i.e., Socrates] . . . compare himself 
to a “gadfly” at the same time as he called himself a divine gift, and why 
did he love young people so much? As for the first, was it not because he, 
as a pagan, . . . had loved people in something higher, that is, because he 
had had an awakening influence . . . ? As for the latter, was it not because 
he perceived that young people still had a receptivity for the divine . . . ? 
Therefore, because he, by means of the eternal and “something divine,” had 
prevented his love for people from coming to a standstill . . . , that is, because 
he, by holding himself close to the requirement, had been like a requirement 
to the people.12
Unlike Evans’s other arguments, this one does militate against the claim that 
the obligation to love one’s neighbor was absolutely “unique and unknown 
in paganism.” For example, Kierkegaard here speaks of Socrates, “as a 
pagan . . . lov[ing] people in something higher.” Furthermore, Kierkegaard 
says it was “by means of the eternal and ‘something divine’” that Socrates 
was moved to love other people in this way. “The eternal” is Kierkegaard’s 
typical poetic manner of referring to an individual’s God-relationship. 
Kierkegaard elsewhere speaks of Socrates’s God-relationship as medi-
ated by his daimonion,13 the curious “divine sign” that opposes Socrates 
whenever he is about to undertake some wrongful (or at least some less-
than-ideal) course of action.14 As for the “something divine,” this is actually 
a transliteration of the precise language that Socrates himself uses to refer 
to his daimonion. So in this passage Kierkegaard strongly indicates that 
Socrates’s daimonion-mediated God-relationship was the “awakening influ-
ence” that moved him to love people and to call himself a “divine gift.”
And that is not all. Contextual facts confirm that Kierkegaard here is 
making quite an extraordinary claim about Socrates’s awareness of an ob-
ligation to love other people. Kierkegaard says that Socrates was capable 
of such love because he “h[eld] himself close to the requirement.” This is 
significant because the context of the quotation makes it clear that “the 
12Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 128–129.
13The entry states:
Ah, now I understand it! Socrates’s daemon was always merely dissuading 
because Socrates’s God-relationship was dialectical. The immediate God-relation-
ship is positive. But the dialectical God-relationship begins in a certain sense with 
nothing, and God first comes in the next round. If I have no immediacy, then I 
must always make the first step myself. God does not immediately or directly tell 
me what I am supposed to do. I do it; according to my best deliberations I regard 
it as the best, and I present it now to God, humbling myself and my resolution, my 
plan, my action under God.
Søren Kierkegaard, Søren Kierkegaard’s Journals and Papers, 7 vols., ed. and trans. Howard 
V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1967–1978) II:107 
(#1373); cf. Søren Kierkegaards Papirer, ed. P. A. Heiberg, V. Kuhr, and E. Torsting, 20 vols. 
I–XI.3 (Copenhagen: Gyldendal, 1909–1948), IX A 242.
14Cf. e.g., Plato, Apology, 31c–d; Phaedrus, 242b–c. All translations of Plato’s works are 
those in Plato’s Complete Works, ed. John M. Cooper (Indianapolis, IN and Cambridge: 
Hackett Publishing Company, 1997).
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requirement” is that of “the Law,”15 that is, “God’s Law,”16 “the Law of love.”17 
Indeed, in the chapter from which this quotation comes (entitled “Love is 
the Fulfilling of the Law”), the phrase, “the Law’s requirement” (my em-
phasis) occurs no less than twenty times. It appears, then, that Kierkegaard 
is attributing to Socrates some awareness of, and obedience to, the obliga-
tion to love the neighbor.18
Of Evans’s three arguments, only the last represents a plausible ex-
ception to the uniqueness claim. The next section takes a closer look at 
Kierkegaard’s uniqueness claim itself, to specify in more precise terms 
how this claim should be understood.
II. The Complexity of the Uniqueness Claim
Where in Works of Love is Kierkegaard’s uniqueness claim to be found? As it 
turns out, there is no one passage in which Kierkegaard articulates such a 
claim. This is because, as I maintain, what Evans identifies as Kierkegaard’s 
“uniqueness claim” is actually a conjunction of two separate theses, which 
(following Kierkegaard’s language) I shall term the “divine-origination 
thesis” and the “no-intimation thesis,” respectively.
First, the divine-origination thesis is linked to Kierkegaard’s claim that 
the obligation to love “did not arise in any human being’s heart,” an allu-
sion to I Corinthians 2:9. This thesis asserts that one can become aware of 
the obligation to love the neighbor only through a divine revelation. The 
following passage is typical:
What courage it takes to say for the first time “You shall love,” or, more 
correctly, what divine authority it takes to turn the natural man’s concep-
tions and ideas upside-down with this phrase! There at the boundary where 
human language halts and courage fails, there revelation breaks forth with 
divine origination and proclaims what is not difficult to understand in the 
sense of profundity or human parallels but which did not arise in any hu-
man being’s heart. It actually is not difficult to understand once it has been 
expressed; indeed, it wants only to be understood in order to be practiced, 
but it did not arise in any human being’s heart.19
15Cf., e.g., Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 128–129.
16Cf. Ibid., 126.
17Cf. Ibid., 118.
18Jacob Howland has observed that, for Kierkegaard, “Socrates’s life is graced by an ex-
traordinary integrity of understanding and existing. In him, speech and deed, logos and 
ergon, are one; his actions are fully in harmony with his grasp of the truth.” Kierkegaard and 
Socrates: A Study in Philosophy and Faith (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 213. 
Howland explains that Kierkegaard’s pseudonym, “Climacus[,] makes it clear in [Concluding 
Unscientific] Postscript that Socrates’s philosophical passion is extraordinary. Kierkegaard 
agrees. In his journals, he indicates that Socrates is unique in being able, without following 
Christ’s example, to live up to his understanding of the truth and thus to actualize the 
ideal. Others simply lack the condition of genuinely philosophical eros that makes this pos-
sible.” Ibid., 211–212. See also the epilogue of Howland’s book, which examines several of 
Kierkegaard’s intriguing statements about Socrates.
19Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 24–25.
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The divine origination thesis is stated four times in Works of Love, and 
every instance is to be found in chapter II, section A.20
Second, the no-intimation thesis is the simple claim that there is no in-
timation of neighbor love (i.e., of the obligation to love the neighbor) in 
paganism. Following are two of those passages:
One must rather take care to make it very clear that the praise of erotic 
love and friendship belongs to paganism . . . so that with the sure spirit of 
conviction we can give to Christianity what is Christianity’s, love for the 
neighbor, of which love no intimation [Anelse] is to be found in paganism.21
And again,
Christianity has misgivings about erotic love and friendship simply because 
preferential love in passion or passionate preference is actually another form 
of self-love. Paganism has never dreamed of this. . . . [P]aganism has never 
had an inkling [aldrig har anet] of self-denial’s love for the neighbor, whom 
one shall love.22
The Danish noun Anelse in the first passage is well-translated into English 
as “intimation.” The semantic range of Anelse overlaps that of the English 
words presentiment, anticipation, suggestion, clue, and hint.23 Likewise, 
the Danish phrase aldrig har anet, meaning “never had a presentiment / 
clue / hint / (etc.)” is also well captured by the translation of the second 
passage. Thus, the no-intimation thesis states that there is no intimation of 
the obligation to love the neighbor in paganism. This thesis occurs three 
times in Works of Love, and every instance is to be found in chapter II, 
section B.24
It turns out that what Evans calls the uniqueness claim is actually the 
conjunction of the divine-origination thesis and the no-intimation thesis—
a fact that is supported by Evans’s appeal to instances of both theses to 
support his way of characterizing the uniqueness claim.25 The conjunction 
of these theses reads as follows: one can become aware of the obligation to 
love the neighbor only through a divine revelation and there is no intima-
tion of neighbor love in paganism. Each conjunct makes a claim whose 
truth-value is logically independent of the other’s. Therefore, each con-
junct can stand or fall independently of the other. Were one to attempt to 
discredit the uniqueness claim, it would suffice merely to cast doubt on 
one of its conjuncts.
With this fact in mind, we should reflect again on the arguments Evans 
gives in support of his interpretation of Kierkegaard’s ethical views. As it 
20Cf. Ibid., 24–25, 27, and 42.
21Ibid., 44.
22Ibid., 53; the second sentence begins a new paragraph.
23See, e.g., the entry for “anelse” in Dansk-Engelsk Ordbog, ed. Jens Axelsen (Copenhagen: 
Gyldendal, 1978).
24Cf. Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 44, 53, and 57.
25Cf. Evans, Kierkegaard’s Ethic of Love, 157.
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happens, all the considerations Evans advances against the uniqueness claim 
are aimed at only one of its conjuncts—the no-intimation thesis.26 As we 
noted, Evans’s first two arguments fall short of the mark, but the third pro-
vides strong reasons to doubt Kierkegaard’s across-the-board commitment 
to the no-intimation thesis. Evans’s third argument points to Kierkegaard’s 
belief that Socrates possessed some awareness of the obligation to love the 
neighbor—a clear counterexample to the no-intimation thesis.
It is important to note that Kierkegaard’s belief that Socrates possessed 
some awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor is not contrary to a 
statement that Kierkegaard later makes to the effect that Socrates lacked 
knowledge of the obligation to love the neighbor. Later in Works of Love, 
Kierkegaard discusses Socrates’s language in the Symposium about loving 
one who is ugly.27 Kierkegaard identifies love for an ugly person with com-
manded neighbor-love, and he states that Socrates knew nothing about 
the fact that “one shall love him” (emphasis in original). Kierkegaard 
says, “one shall love him—that simple wise man knew nothing about this; 
he did not know that the neighbor existed and that one shall love him. 
His talk about loving the ugly was just teasing.”28 Clearly, Kierkegaard 
states that Socrates did not have knowledge that one is obligated to love 
the neighbor. Thus, whatever awareness Socrates’s “awakening influence” 
gave him, that awareness fell short of full-blown knowledge of the obli-
gation to love the neighbor. But it is by no means necessary to possess 
knowledge of that obligation in order to have an awareness that amounts to 
or even rises above an intimation of it. So Kierkegaard’s statement does not 
conflict with his other remarks to the effect that Socrates possessed some 
awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor.
In sum, because Kierkegaard believed that Socrates had some aware-
ness of the obligation to love the neighbor, Evans’s argument successfully 
shows that Kierkegaard did not have an across-the-board commitment to 
the no-intimation thesis.29
III. Socrates’s Divine Revelation
To take stock of what has been established thus far: on one hand, Kierkeg-
aard’s remarks on Socrates give us reason to doubt his across-the-board 
26Of course, Evans sometimes talks as if his first argument is aimed at undermining the 
divine origination thesis; however, this is a moot point, since the argument fails to provide 
grounds for doubting either thesis.
27See Plato’s Symposium, 210b–c. The statement is put into the mouth of Diotima.
28The emphasis is in the original. This is my translation of the following passage, which is 
found at location IX.353 of the Danish text: “Man skal elske ham, dette vidste hiin eenfoldige 
Vise Intet om, han vidste ikke, at Næsten var til og at man skulde elske ham, det han talte om 
at elske den Stygge var blot et Drillerie.” In the Princeton edition of Works of Love, which is 
translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, the corresponding passage is on p. 373.
29Kierkegaard’s journals contain other interesting comments on Socrates. For example, 
Kierkegaard wrote, “Outside of Christianity Socrates stands alone—you noble, simple wise 
man—you were actually a reformer.” Journals and Papers, VI: 508 (#6871); cf. Papirer, XI.1 A 
133.
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commitment to the no-intimation thesis. On the other hand, Kierkegaard’s 
commitment to the divine-origination thesis has escaped unscathed. 
Therefore, we are left with Kierkegaard’s commitment to two claims: 
first, that Socrates possesses some awareness of the obligation to love the 
neighbor. And, second, that one can come to possess some awareness of 
the obligation to love the neighbor only through a divine revelation. Now, 
one might pause to ask whether this is a problem. After all, taking these 
two claims as premises, one could by modus ponens validly conclude that 
Kierkegaard is logically committed to Socrates’s having received a divine 
revelation.
Given only what has been established thus far, one might argue that 
general revelation is sufficient to account for Socrates’s awareness of the 
obligation to love the neighbor. Perhaps Socrates was unusually recep-
tive to the general revelation that is universally available in creation. If 
this were the case, then Kierkegaard’s commitment to Socrates’s having 
received a divine revelation would amount to nothing more sensational 
than a commitment to accessibilism, a position in Christian soteriological 
debates. Accessibilists maintain, in part, that those who are without the 
benefit of special revelation can still gain salvation through a Spirit-enabled 
response of trust to the general revelation of God in nature, experience, 
and reason.30 (Accessibilism is typically contrasted with forms of what is 
variously called restrictivism or exclusivism, the view that salvation is avail-
able only to those individuals with explicit knowledge of Christian special 
revelation.) In fact, one might argue, this commitment really amounts to 
something weaker than the accessibilist position, for no reason has been 
given to show that Kierkegaard believed that Socrates actually obtained 
salvation.
This last point would stand securely were it not for a telling remark that 
Kierkegaard makes in The Point of View for My Work as an Author. Speaking 
of Socrates’s indirect method of communication, Kierkegaard says, “in this 
respect I calmly stick to Socrates. True, he was no Christian, that I know, 
although I also definitely remain convinced that he has become one.”31 
While it is hard to know exactly how to interpret this statement, it seems 
at least to indicate Kierkegaard’s “definite . . . convi[ction]” that Socrates 
achieved salvation at some time subsequent to his physical death. This is 
naturally interpreted as a belief in postmortem evangelization, the view 
that a person who was not evangelized before death enjoys an opportu-
nity to respond to the Christian gospel subsequent to his or her death.32
30A version of accessibilism is defended in Terrance L. Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved? Reas-
sessing Christ and World Religions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004).
31Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author trans. Howard V. Hong 
and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 54.
32While I do not hold a postmortem evangelization view, proponents of that view often 
cite John 3:18 and 1 Peter 3:18–4:6 in support of their position.
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Historically, the early Church Father Clement of Alexandria held a 
postmortem evangelization view.33 Other proponents include nineteenth-
century author George MacDonald, theologians Donald Bloesch, George 
Lindbeck, and Gabriel Fackre, and philosopher Stephen T. Davis.34 If 
Kierkegaard believed in some sort of postmortem evangelization, then 
the question of how to characterize his view turns on whether that 
evangelization is itself supposed to take the form of general or special 
revelation. If the former, then Kierkegaard would seem to be committed 
to a sort of straightforward postmortem accessibilism. If the latter, then 
Kierkegaard’s position appears to be that Socrates received a postmortem 
version of what Terrance L. Tiessen calls “particular but nonuniversally 
normative revelation,”35 or as I call it, “nonuniversally-normative special 
revelation.” As Tiessen describes it, this kind of revelation “is ‘special’ in 
its particularity or limited address, but it is not ‘special’ in the sense of 
being revelation from God intended for everyone, everywhere—that is, it 
is not universally normative.”36
Either way, Kierkegaard’s “definite . . . convi[ction] that [Socrates] has 
become [a Christian]” fits naturally at the intersection of Kierkegaard’s 
own unabashed Christian commitment, his superlative admiration for 
Socrates, and his awareness of Socrates’s view that even the unexamined 
afterlife would not be worth living. In the Apology, Socrates considers 
“that there is good hope that death is a blessing” because it is possible 
that death is “a change and a relocating for the soul from here to another 
place.”37 Socrates reflects:
If . . . anyone arriving in Hades . . . will find those true jurymen who are 
said to sit in judgment there, Minos and Rhadamanthus and Aeacus and 
Triptolemus and the other demi-gods who have been upright in their own 
life, would that be a poor kind of change? Again, what would one of you 
give to keep company with Orpheus and Musaeus, Hesiod and Homer? I 
am willing to die many times if that is true. It would be a wonderful way 
for me to spend my time whenever I met Palamedes and Ajax, the son of 
Telamon, and any other of the men of old who died through an unjust con-
viction, to compare my experiences with theirs. I think it would be pleas-
ant. Most important, I could spend my time testing and examining people 
there, as I do here, as to who among them is wise, and who thinks he is, 
but is not.38
33See Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, 6.6.
34See Gabriel Fackre, Ronald H. Nash, and John Sanders, What About Those Who Have 
Never Heard? Three Views on the Destiny of the Unevangelized (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity 
Press, 1995), 20; see also John Sanders, No Other Name: An Investigation into the Destiny of the 
Unevangelized (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock Publishers, 2001); Stephen T. Davis, “Universalism, 
Hell, and the Fate of the Ignorant,” Modern Theology 6 (1990), 176.
35Tiessen uses this exact phrase in Who Can Be Saved?, 139
36Tiessen, Who Can Be Saved?, 120.
37Plato, Apology, 40c.
38Plato, Apology, 41a–c.
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Kierkegaard naturally would have conceived Christ as among those 
who, in Socrates’s words, were “upright in their own life” and who “died 
through an unjust conviction.” It is fascinating to imagine the possibility 
that Christ was among those whom Socrates “test[ed] and examin[ed]” to 
determine “who among them is wise.”
Regardless of what we make of Kierkegaard’s view of Socrates’s post-
mortem experience, however, there remains the question regarding the 
source of Socrates’s premortem awareness—that is, Socrates’s awareness 
during his lifetime—of the obligation to love the neighbor. Can that aware-
ness be explained as the result of general revelation? Above we saw that 
Kierkegaard indicates that it was “by means of the eternal and ‘something 
divine’”—that is, by the daimonion-mediated God-relationship—that 
Socrates came to some awareness of the obligation to love.
The daimonion has been so embarrassing to some modern scholars that 
they have attempted to explain it away as nothing more than the voice 
of conscience. But this simply will not do. For, besides the daimonion’s 
making its appearance in some situations where no moral wrong is about 
to be committed,39 Socrates makes clear that it is a quite rare phenom-
enon, having happened, as he says, “to no one before [him], or to only a 
very few.”40 By that remark, Socrates was not accusing the vast majority of 
humanity as being without a conscience. Kierkegaard was aware of this 
fact, having written a section of his dissertation on Socrates’s daimonion 
in which he affirmed both its historical reality as well as its externality 
to Socrates’s subjectivity.41 All of these factors indicate that Kierkegaard’s 
understanding of the daimonion’s activity simply cannot be cashed out in 
terms of general revelation. Rather, it must be understood as a case of 
nonuniversally-normative special revelation—and this is the position to 
which it appears that Kierkegaard was committed.42
I should hasten to point out that viewing the pagan Socrates as a re-
cipient of nonuniversally-normative special revelation is not so outlandish 
a position as it might at first appear. After all, Abraham—the father of the 
three great monotheistic faiths—was himself a pagan when God first ap-
peared to him,43 as were the Magi, the astrologers from the east who were 
guided by the star to the location of Jesus.44 Indeed, several more examples 
from the Bible alone can be given. Other clear examples of pagans who 
39Cf. e.g., Plato, Euthydemus, 272e.
40Plato, Republic, 496c.
41Cf. Søren Kierkegaard, The Concept of Irony: With Continual Reference to Socrates, trans. 
Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 
157–167.
42Paul W. Gooch has written a interesting book, Reflections on Jesus and Socrates: Word and 
Silence (New Haven, CT and London: Yale University Press, 1996). Gooch states, “I find in 
Socrates not Christian faith but a stance toward the god that shares a recognizable architec-
ture with the experience of Christian faith.” Ibid., 18.
43See Genesis 12, Acts 7:2 and, most importantly, Joshua 24:2.
44See Matthew 2.
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received a special divine revelation include Abimelech, the king of Gerar45; 
Balaam, the pagan prophet46; Job47; King Neco48; and Cornelius, the Roman 
centurion.49 Other likely examples include Melchizedek,50 Pharaoh,51 King 
Nebuchadnezzar,52 King Belshazzar,53 King Cyrus,54 and Eliphaz the 
Temanite.55 Thus, it is not really so odd or unusual to hold that a pagan 
was a recipient of special divine revelation. In fact, to all appearances, it 
seems that a Christian should hold that God is quite willing to give special 
revelations to pagans when it serves his good pleasure to do so.
IV. Apostle, Genius, or Something Else?
Readers familiar with Kierkegaard’s Book on Adler will have a special reason 
for concern at the primary conclusion of the preceding section. After all, it 
might be thought that the claim that Kierkegaard was committed to Socrates 
being the beneficiary of special divine revelation implies that Socrates is to 
be viewed as an “apostle” in the sense that Kier kegaard gives to this term—
a view that Kierkegaard no doubt would have rejected out of hand. But to 
claim that Socrates was the beneficiary of special divine revelation is by no 
means to imply that he was an apostle in Kierkegaard’s sense.
To see why, it is necessary to get clearer on Kierkegaard’s project in The 
Book On Adler. This work is Kierkegaard’s response to the confused and 
shifting claims of Adolph Adler, a pastor on the Danish island of Born-
holm. Adler claimed to have received a revelation in which a new doctrine 
was dictated to him by Jesus Christ—only later to declare that his “revela-
tion” was actually a work of “genius.” Kierkegaard’s main goal in this 
book is to rigorously distinguish the category of “apostle” from that of 
“genius,” and thereby to bring crucial dialectical clarity about such mat-
ters into the public consciousness. But, as it happened, Kierkegaard never 
published the book, largely out of concern for Adler and for the effect that 
the book would have had on him.
In the book, Kierkegaard explains that “[t]he qualification ‘genius’ lies 
within the sphere of immanence.”56 That is, the insights or productions 
of the genius are a consequence of a purely human resourcefulness and 
45See Genesis 20.
46See Numbers 22–24.
47See Job 38.
48See II Chronicles 35.
49See Acts 10.
50See Genesis 14.
51See Genesis 41.
52See Daniel 4.
53Ibid.
54See Ezra 1.
55See Job 4.
56Søren Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princ-
eton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), 174.
134 Faith and Philosophy
creativity. Furthermore, “the genius,” Kierkegaard says, “is born.”57 In 
other words, as a genius, one’s achievements are realizations of a potential 
that has existed within oneself from birth. A genius comes into one’s own 
as a natural consequence of one’s life-development. Moreover, a claim that 
one is a genius is justified by appeal to rational or aesthetic considerations. 
As such, even one who does not qualify as a genius can resemble the 
genius to a greater or lesser degree, depending upon one’s native endow-
ments or capacities.
The apostle, on the other hand, is “not born.”58 Rather, just as Kierke-
gaard describes the genius as belonging to the “sphere of immanence,” 
so the apostle is said to belong to the “sphere of transcendence.”59 This 
means that the apostle’s doctrine proceeds from a source that is transcen-
dent of human powers. Even if the apostle’s doctrine is comprehensible 
or independently discoverable by human beings, the manner in which 
the apostle comes to be in possession of the doctrine is qualitatively dif-
ferent than the way in which one who is a genius “hits upon” one’s ideas. 
Furthermore, in Kierkegaard’s description, “the apostle is a man who is 
called and appointed by God and sent by him on a mission. An apostle 
does not develop in such a way that he gradually becomes what he is 
[potentially]. Prior to becoming an apostle, there is no potential possi-
bility; every human being is essentially equally close to becoming that.”60 
Contrary to the genius, then, there can be no resemblance of greater or 
lesser degree to the apostle, for an apostle is not what he is due to his na-
tive endowments. Rather, “every human being is essentially equally close 
to becoming” an apostle by being the subject of an authoritative special 
revelation.61
Given this description, the reader might feel confirmed in his or her 
suspicion that I am making Socrates into an apostle. After all, as I have ar-
gued, the manner in which Socrates comes to awareness of the obligation 
to love the neighbor is through the activity of the daimonion, a transcen-
dent, divine phenomenon whose communication takes the form of special 
revelation.62 Furthermore, anyone familiar with the Oracle at Delphi’s sig-
nificance to Socrates’s philosophical activity will know that Socrates did 
claim to have been appointed by the god and sent on a religious mission 
to the people of Athens.63 So how, then, can one consistently maintain that 
Socrates is not an apostle?
57Ibid., 175.
58Ibid., 176.
59Ibid., 175.
60Ibid., 176.
61Ibid.
62More precisely, I have argued that Kierkegaard is committed to the view that this is the 
case.
63Cf. Plato, Apology, 20e–23b, 28e, and 29d–30a.
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The key comes in taking careful note of a particular quality that 
Kierkegaard ascribes to the apostle. As he writes, “[A]n apostle is what 
he is by having divine authority. The divine authority is what is qualitatively 
decisive.”64 This authority, Kierkegaard maintains, is what separates the 
apostle Paul, for example, from a Plato or a Shakespeare.65 To wit, whereas 
the insights or productions of the genius are judged to be true or great by 
appeal to rational or aesthetic criteria, the apostle’s doctrine is asserted 
simply on the basis of its divine authority. Indeed, Kierkegaard imagines 
the apostle to declare, “I make you eternally responsible for your relation-
ship to this doctrine by my having proclaimed it as revealed to me and 
therefore by having proclaimed it with divine authority.”66
It is very hard to envisage such a declaration coming from the mouth 
of Socrates. As the quintessential philosopher, Socrates characteristically 
seeks to justify his views by appeal to rational considerations. Indeed, 
Socrates is never found appealing to the authority of his daimonion as if 
to hold people responsible for a doctrine that it has revealed. Lacking this 
“qualitatively decisive” characteristic, then, Socrates cannot be an apostle.
This does not, of course, mean that we must categorize Socrates as a 
mere genius. After all, between the genius and the apostle there is not an 
excluded middle. Just as Kierkegaard would distinguish Socrates from the 
apostle Paul, so I maintain, he would distinguish Socrates from Plato. And 
as a matter of fact, Kierkegaard does so quite explicitly. In Concluding Un-
scientific Postscript Kierkegaard describes Socrates as continually departing 
from Plato. The thesis that all knowing is recollecting, Kierkegaard says,
certainly belongs to both of them, but Socrates continually parts with it be-
cause he wants to exist. By holding Socrates to the thesis that all knowing is 
recollecting, one turns him into a speculative philosopher instead of what he 
was, an existing thinker who understood existing as the essential. The thesis 
that all knowing is recollecting belongs to speculative thought, and recol-
lecting is immanence. . . . To emphasize existence . . . is the Socratic, whereas 
the Platonic is to pursue recollection and immanence.67
Plato, then, is concerned with what can be accomplished merely by means 
of the capacities that lie immanently within one’s own self. In contrast, 
Socrates emphasizes “existence,” which, in Kierkegaard’s distinctive 
sense, means an ethico-religious striving toward an ideal. Given that it was 
“by means of the eternal and ‘something divine,’ [that Socrates] prevented 
his love for people from coming to a standstill,”68 and his consequent 
“holding himself close to the requirement”69 by means of the daimonion, it 
64Kierkegaard, The Book on Adler, 177 (emphasis in original).
65Cf. Ibid., 174.
66Ibid., 177.
67Søren Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript to Philosophical Fragments, trans. 
Howard V. and Edna H. Hong (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), Vol. I, 206n.
68Kierkegaard, Works of Love, 128–129.
69Ibid.
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is plausible to view Socrates’s ethico-religious striving as dependent upon 
this transcendent source—and hence, to view Socrates as excluded from 
the category of mere genius.
Labeling Socrates as a mere genius becomes even less plausible once 
one recognizes that Kierkegaard remarks upon the “analogous likeness” 
of Socrates’s situation to the Christian paradox that goes beyond human 
speculative powers.70 Indeed, the original concern that I was making 
Socrates into an apostle is not totally without grounding, for Socrates cer-
tainly does resemble the apostle in very important ways, not least of which 
is his being the beneficiary of special divine revelation. (Although, to be 
sure, none of these resemblances is of that kind which Kierkegaard explic-
itly rules out, namely, resemblance in the possession of divine authority). 
So just as we saw that Socrates is not an apostle, neither is he a genius. 
Rather, lacking the qualitatively decisive properties of each category—
divine authority, on one hand, and a purely human resourcefulness, on 
the other—it seems that we must understand Socrates as constituting a 
category all his own.
V. Revelation Without Authority
Socrates was not an apostle, yet neither was he a mere genius. But how 
can it be, one might ask, that Socrates was the beneficiary of special divine 
revelation, yet failed to possess any authority on account of that revela-
tion? To answer this question, it is necessary to inquire into the nature of 
Socrates’s divine sign. Recall the charge that Socrates corrupted the youth 
of Athens. Upon hearing this charge, Euthyphro points out the connection 
between it and Socrates’s daimonion:
[EUTHYPHRO:] Tell me, what does [Meletus] say you do to corrupt the 
young?
SOCRATES: Strange things, to hear him tell it, for he says that I am a maker 
of gods, and on the ground that I create new gods while not believing in the 
old gods, he has indicted me for their sake, as he puts it.
EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates. This is because you say that the di-
vine sign keeps coming to you. So he has written this indictment against you 
as one who makes innovations in religious matters.71
In attributing Socrates’s prosecution to his claim to have the daimonion, 
Euthyphro has not merely jumped to the wrong conclusion, as he so often 
does. Rather, Euthyphro’s explanation is later confirmed in Socrates’s 
defense against Meletus and his other “later accusers.”72 There, Socrates 
says, “I have a divine or spiritual sign which Meletus has ridiculed in his 
deposition. This began when I was a child. It is a voice, and whenever it 
speaks it turns me away from something I am about to do, but it never 
70Cf. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 206n.
71Plato, Euthyphro, 3a–b
72Plato, Apology, 24b–35d.
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encourages me to do anything.”73 Thus, the daimonion provides an expla-
nation of why Socrates is being prosecuted.
But just a bit later in the dialogue, Socrates gives a different explanation 
for his prosecution. He says, “Indeed, Euthyphro, this is the reason why 
I am a defendant in the case, because I find it hard to accept things like 
that [i.e., stories of murder, cannibalism, castration, quarrels, battles, etc.] 
being said about the gods.”74 Here, Socrates’s explanation is that he is being 
prosecuted because he cannot believe in stories of immoral gods (where 
“immoral” is understood to denote actions relevantly similar to murder, 
cannibalism, castration, quarrels, battles, etc.). What is the relationship 
between this explanation and the first explanation? That is, what is the 
relationship between Socrates’s belief in his daimonion and Socrates’s dis-
belief in stories of immoral gods? Is one explanatorily more fundamental?
It could be that Socrates’s belief in his daimonion and his disbelief 
in stories of immoral gods are separate and unrelated examples of his 
particular heterodoxy. But exploring the possibility of an explanatory 
connection yields some intriguing insights. It is hard to see how Socrates’s 
disbelief in stories of immoral gods could be explanatorily prior to his 
belief in the daimonion. But it is not quite as difficult to see how his belief 
in the daimonion could be explanatorily prior to his disbelief in stories of 
immoral gods.
The case can be made that Socrates’s self-avowed life-long75 and 
frequent76 acquaintance with the divine sign was itself the decisive de-
terminant of what were, for his context, his radically progressive moral 
and religious views. One thing such a case must explain is how Socrates 
gets from the daimonion’s appearances—which are always merely dis-
suading—to his positive moral and religious notions. Given what has 
been established above, Socrates receives a revelation when the daimonion 
makes its sign, but the content of each revelation amounts to nothing more 
than a minutely specific prohibition: Socrates knows, at that specific time 
and place, that the specific action he is about to perform is the wrong thing 
to do. As one commentator notes, “This leaves a good deal for Socrates 
to reason about: What about this act-token is wrong, or is it the act-type? 
What about the current situation makes it wrong? In what does wrong-
ness itself consist? and so on.”77 Furthermore,
[t]he daimonion offers Socrates no rules of conduct, no general principles, no 
moral definitions; its activity seems always to be unexpected and it offers 
73Plato, Apology, 31d; note that Xenophon also concurs in this regard. See his Memorabilia, 
I.1.12.
74Plato, Euthyphro, 6a.
75Plato, Apology, 31d.
76Socrates refers to the daimonion as his “familiar sign,” indicating that its promptings 
were quite frequent, indeed; cf. e.g., Plato, Apology, 40c.
77Thomas C. Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, “Socrates’ Gods and the Daimonion,” 
in Reason and Religion in Socratic Philosophy, ed. Nicholas D. Smith and Paul B. Woodruff 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 86.
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Socrates no explanations of its activity. However slight the information he 
has received, it is enough to prevent Socrates from taking so much as an-
other step in the undertaking he was considering. Socrates may not know 
the first thing about why he has been stopped, but he seems completely and 
unshakably certain that he must not do what he was about to do.78
So how does Socrates get from the opposition of the daimonion to his rad-
ical moral and religious notions, including his awareness of the obligation 
to love the neighbor? The following considerations provide the essential 
ingredients of a plausible explanation of the process.
First, Socrates’s source of confidence in the rightness of his actions 
lends support to this understanding of the daimonion’s role. As Socrates 
explains in the Apology,
At all previous times my familiar prophetic power, my spiritual manifesta-
tion, frequently opposed me, even in small matters, when I was about to do 
something wrong, but now that, as you can see for yourselves, I was faced 
with what one might think, and what is generally thought to be, the worst of 
evils, my divine sign has not opposed me, either when I left home at dawn, 
or when I came into court, or at any time that I was about to say something 
during my speech. . . . What do I think is the reason for this? I will tell you. 
What has happened to me may well be a good thing, and those of us who 
believe death to be an evil are certainly mistaken. I have convincing proof of 
this, for it is impossible that my familiar sign did not oppose me if I was not 
about to do what was right [agathon].79
As this passage shows, although the daimonion’s appearances are always 
specific and prohibitive, Socrates can still find the daimonion’s non-appear-
ances to be quite instructive, given its extensive history of opposing him 
when he was about to do something wrong. Here Socrates says that it is 
impossible that the daimonion did not oppose him if his actions were not 
going to result in something agathon—the adjective form of arête (virtue, 
excellence) and the strongest term of approbation in the Greek language.80 
Socrates’s inference is that, because his daimonion did not appear, he can 
be assured that his actions will produce a virtuous or excellent result.
Thus, what Socrates takes away from this experience is not just the 
negative conviction that it is a mistake to believe that death is an evil. 
Rather, immediately after this passage, this experience gives rise in 
Socrates’s mind to the “good hope”—or perhaps we should say, the 
“inkling” or “intimation”—“that death is a blessing.”81 This was quite a 
radical sentiment in Socrates’s ancient Athenian context, but Socrates was 
utterly unashamed to declare it, even if it meant incurring the ridicule of 
his listeners. Indeed, Socrates was gripped by something stronger than 
78Brickhouse and Smith, “Socrates’ Gods and the Daimonion,” 86.
79Plato, Apology, 40a–c.
80Arthur W. H. Adkins, Merit and Responsibility: A Study in Greek Values (Oxford: Clar-
endon Press, 1960), 156.
81Plato, Apology, 40c; cf. 41c–d.
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the mores of his culture, which fostered the belief that death was an evil 
and that the most important thing for a dead man was a good reputa-
tion among the living.82 As Arthur Adkins observed in his study of Greek 
values,
Until Socrates, no one takes a firm stand and says, “let them mock.” It can-
not be done: if others’ opinion is overtly the standard, and if one’s beliefs 
about the nature of life support that standard, it is both logically and psy-
chologically impossible to set one’s own views against it. Socrates had his 
daimonion; and needed it.83
Thus, because at any time Socrates is able to draw, not just on the dai-
monion’s immediate appearance or non-appearance, but on the totality 
of his past experiences of it, his reflection on the daimonion’s activity is 
capable of giving rise to affirmative, general, and countercultural views 
about what actions conduce to virtue and wellbeing.
On Kierkegaard’s view, the daimonion would have opposed Socrates’s 
actions that were contrary to love for the neighbor, and the daimonion 
would have forbore to appear whenever Socrates took some action that 
was consistent with love for the neighbor. Through its appearances and 
non-appearances, Socrates would have acquired an extensive mental col-
lection of particular loving behaviors that the daimonion did not oppose. 
By examining those particular actions in order to discern their shared 
nature—Socrates’s routine philosophical procedure84—he would have 
acquired an awareness that actions of a generally altruistic nature were 
conducive to virtue and wellbeing, and hence, morally choiceworthy. 
While not rising to the level of full-blown knowledge, this awareness would 
have constituted at least an “intimation” or “inkling” of the obligation to 
love the neighbor. Furthermore, assuming that Socrates’s experience of 
the daimonion colored his view of the gods generally, he naturally would 
have found “it hard to accept [stories of murder, cannibalism, castration, 
quarrels, battles, etc.] being said about the gods.”85
Of course, Socrates never could have been sure that he had put his 
finger on the precise rule or principle behind the daimonion’s appearances 
and non-appearances. Socrates was well aware of this fact, having fol-
lowed up his statement that “there is good hope that death is a blessing” 
with statements of uncertainty regarding whether that meant that death 
is a pleasant dreamless sleep or a pleasant relocation to another place.86 
While Socrates could have gleaned some things from the daimonion by 
recognizing correlations between its occurrences and his intended actions, 
82Adkins, Merit and Responsibility, 155.
83Ibid., 155–156.
84See, e.g., Euthyphro, 5d–15c.
85Plato, Euthyphro, 6a.
86Plato, Apology, 40c–41c.
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he would have faced an interesting version of the problem of induction:87 
even if the daimonion had, without exception, allowed Socrates to perform 
some particular type of action up to some point in his life, he could not 
have been sure whether all actions of that type were permitted, or whether 
that type of action was permitted, say, merely for individuals under a 
certain age. Indeed, at any time there would be an endless number of prin-
ciples consistent with the observed class of the daimonion’s appearances 
and non-appearances: perhaps some actions are only allowed to parents, 
or grandparents, or only in certain specific circumstances, or only imme-
diately following some other particular action, or only on certain days, 
or only with certain other people, or only while the moon was waxing or 
waning—there are infinite possibilities.
Socrates never could be confident that any inductive generalization 
from the daimonion’s occurrences would have had the backing of divine 
authority, for he is allowed to know neither the rhyme nor the reason 
behind its appearances. Although it is doubtful whether Socrates would 
have understood this problem as a “problem of induction,” nevertheless it 
seems plausible that he would have recognized it as a problem and felt its 
intuitive force. Therefore, although it is plausible to think of the daimonion 
as providing Socrates with a great deal of critical moral input, nothing that 
Socrates inductively discerned from the daimonion’s appearances could 
have qualified as knowledge, let alone as an authoritative revelation. In 
conclusion, Socrates can have a divine revelation and still not possess di-
vine authority because no doctrine is ever revealed to him. Socrates never 
claims to have authority because he has no revealed doctrine that could be 
authoritative.
VI. Why Might God Have Given Socrates the Daimonion?
In this section I shall hazard a couple of broad speculations as to what Ki-
erkegaard might have believed regarding why God chose to give Socrates 
the daimonion. As I argued above, the Christian tradition indicates that 
God is quite willing to give special divine revelations to pagans when it 
serves his good pleasure to do so. Consider this: Socrates lived in a reli-
gious context where many deities were recognized and venerated. If God 
wished to make something of himself known to individuals living in such 
a polytheistic religious context, how might he go about doing so? In order 
to reveal himself truly, he would need to somehow ensure that his revela-
tion was not co-opted into the polytheistic categories of the time. After all, 
in such a context, a straightforward, propositional revelation would run 
the risk of being perceived as simply “one more” utterance from the gods, 
as merely “one more” of the same kind of divine phenomenon with which 
the Athenians were so familiar.
87This might be better described as a version of the problem of underdetermination. See 
Pierre Duhem, The Aim and Structure of Physical Theory, trans. Philip Wiener (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1991).
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The danger of this kind of mistaken co-option is well-attested by 
chapter 14 of the New Testament book of Acts, which records an incident 
wherein the apostles Paul and Barnabas were mistaken for the gods Zeus 
and Hermes, and in sensational fashion. After the apostles’ preaching and 
miraculous healing of a lame man in the city of Lystra, the people excit-
edly proclaimed to one another that “the gods have come down to us in 
the form of men!”88 and the priest of Zeus even brought oxen and gar-
lands to the city gates in order to make a sacrifice.89 Such behavior on the 
part of the people is rendered intelligible by the fact that local mythology 
told of a prior visit to a city in the ancient kingdom of Phrygia by Zeus 
and Hermes. According to the legend, the gods were not well-received 
and, as a consequence, they chose to destroy the city with a flood.90 The 
people of Lystra were no doubt greatly motivated to avoid repeating the 
Phrygians’ mistake—hence their piously energetic reception of Paul and 
Barnabas.
It is in part to avoid the danger of being misunderstood in this way 
that, when Paul later proclaims the resurrection of Christ to the Athenians 
in the Areopagus, he goes to such great lengths to stress that the God of 
which he speaks is the uniquely uncreated Creator of all things—and even 
then, the book of Acts relates that many Athenians came away believing 
that Paul had proclaimed to them two new deities: “Christ” and “Anas-
tasis”—that is, “Resurrection”—a woman’s name in Greek.91 Accounts 
such as this demonstrate why, in a polytheistic religious context, God’s 
use of a daimonion-like manifestation to communicate truth about Himself, 
His character, or His will might make very good sense, indeed.
Furthermore, Socrates was more or less the initiator of the grand 
Hellenistic philosophical tradition that shaped the intellectual climate 
within which the doctrines of the early Christian church were formed. 
If a professing Christian is not to reject such central Christian dogmas as 
the Trinity and the Incarnation, it seems that one must accept the validity 
of the conceptual categories in which such doctrines were expressed, 
categories that were themselves forged in the fires of Greek philosophy. 
Since Christians will readily accept that God was providentially at work 
preparing the Jews for the proclamation of the Gospel,92 it is not much 
of a stretch to hold that God was, in Socrates’s daimonion, working in the 
Gentile world to lay the philosophical groundwork for the subsequent 
88Acts 14:11.
89Acts 14:13.
90Cf. Craig S. Keener, The IVP Bible Background Commentary: New Testament (Downers 
Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), 361–363.
91Cf. Acts 17:18 and the commentary on this verse in Keener, The IVP Bible Background 
Commentary, 372–373.
92Cf. Galatians 4:4–5: “But when the fullness of the time came, God sent forth his Son, born of 
a woman, born under the Law, so that He might redeem those who were under the Law, that 
we might receive adoption as sons” (my emphasis).
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articulation of Christian doctrine.93 These possibilities are consistent with 
Kierkegaard’s other views and can be thought of as a natural development 
or logical extension of the comments that he makes on Socrates.
VII. Conclusion
In conclusion, it would be misleading—although perhaps not inaccurate—
to say that Kierkegaard saw Socrates as a Christian before Christ. After all, 
Kierkegaard held that Socrates was not a Christian during his lifetime, 
even while being convinced that he did in fact become one subsequent to 
his death—and perhaps prior to Christ! Furthermore, Kierkegaard held 
that Socrates was, during his lifetime, a very special figure with a quite 
unusual relationship to God. Specifically, Kierkegaard held that by means 
of his daimonion Socrates received nonuniversally-normative special di-
vine revelations—revelations that, though falling short of imparting any 
authoritative doctrine, nevertheless plausibly provided Socrates with cru-
cially determinative, morally formative guidance that ultimately brought 
him to some awareness of the obligation to love the neighbor. Moreover, 
Kierkegaard held that one can come to possess an awareness of this ob-
ligation only through divine revelation, and, interestingly enough, this 
claim—what above I have called the divine origination thesis—can itself 
be understood as a kind of uniqueness claim. The most appropriate way 
of understanding this statement is to construe it, not as identifying Chris-
tianity as unique, but as the claim that, regardless of how many times an 
awareness of the obligation to love may have appeared in human history, 
any such awareness proceeds from a unique source. To be sure, the claim is 
not that the content of Christianity has no parallels in any other religion or 
wisdom tradition, but rather that the obligation to love is something that 
must be divinely impressed anytime it appears.94
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Arkansas
93John Mark Reynolds has recently explored related ideas in chapter 10 of When Athens 
Met Jerusalem: An Introduction to Classical and Christian Thought (Downers Grove, IL: InterVar-
sity Press, 2009).
94I am grateful to C. Stephen Evans for his written comments and to audience members 
for their comments on a previous version of this paper, which was presented at the De-
cember 2008 meeting of the Søren Kierkegaard Society at the eastern APA. I am also grateful 
for constructive comments I received from Thomas Flint and two anonymous reviewers. 
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